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Kant, Critique of Judgment, “Teleology”

PHIL 409, Kant and the twentieth century, Fall 2026

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1 A little taste of teleology

As a quick appetizer on teleological judgment, let’s look at §§64–65, pp. 248–255. Let me pose two very general questions for you as framing what Kant has to say about teleological judgment.

  1. Is he kidding or not? Here’s what I mean. When Kant talks about trees, for example: Does he think they involve natural purposes, or no? or is that just a figment of our reasoning about them?
  2. What’s going on? Why is Kant talking about teleological judgment in the same book he discussed aesthetic judgment?

And first, what is a ‘teleological judgment’? A telos is an end or purpose. An end or purpose, in the relevant sense, is involved only where there are live intentions, and only or most conspicuously in the case of practical-rational action.

  • I want to do or accomplish \(p\), so I do \(q\), on the reasoning that:
  • \(q\) is necessary for doing \(p\).
  • When someone says, He did \(q\) in order to do \(p\),
  • \(q\) is being ‘judged telogically’ as having \(p\) for its purpose.

A teleological judgment situates something in an intentional or goal-oriented process. The principle of such a judgment is practical reason.

Thus p. 248.

Our reason is led inevitably to attribute purposes to things, especially weird ones. Consider pp. 248–249.

2 Natural purposes

To say that something is a natural purpose, however, involves claiming that the purpose lies in the thing itself. See p. 249 green. Kant illustrates this with the example of a tree:

  • A tree produces another ‘like’ itself; it is both the cause (as the progenitor) and the effect (at least in terms of its species) of this ‘action’
  • Through growth, a tree produces itself. This happens through digestion: Food gets turned into tree. And, Kant notes, although we might have all the ‘ingredients’ that go into making a tree, we can’t make tree out of it the way the tree can.
    • Sort of an interesting thought; highlighted on p. 250.
  • A tree is an articulate thing, consisting of complex relations of dependence, and independence, interdependence, and mutuality. Consider organ transplants. They evidence a certain independence of the organ, but they and the organism cannot exist apart from each other (for too long anyway).

In the following section, Kant then lays out two necessary “requirements” of a natural purpose:

  1. “The possibility of its parts . . . must depend on their relation to the whole”; see p. 252.
  2. “The parts of the thing [must] combine into the unity of a whole because they are reciprocally cause and effect of their form”; see p. 252 green.

And see the summary in blue, pp. 252–253.

Kant then uses a watch to make out the difference between natural and artifically designed things. Now, here especially I want us to be wondering: Is all this merely a prerogative of our judgment? or is Kant describing actual objective facts of the matter for natural as opposed to articial things? See p. 253.

  • Note further how Kant rejects the nature-as-maker model on pp. 253–254.
  • And consider this passage in light of the What’s going on? question in blue on p. 254.

For all that, the official line though is that teleology in nature is merely a principle of reflective judgment. See p. 255.